Abstract: Prior literature has documented that investor attention is associated with the pricing of stocks. We examine attention comovement, the extent to which investor attention for a firm is affected by attention paid to the industry and market in general. We find that attention comovement is positively related to comovement in firm fundamentals, and is also related to firm characteristics, such as size and visibility. We also find that the comovement of investor attention has market consequences: attention comovement is positively associated with excess stock return and trading volume comovement. Finally, we show that a prominent information release (a firm's earnings announcement) contributes to attention comovement. Our results aid in understanding the industry and market-wide nature of investor attention and its market consequences.
INTRODUCTION
Recent research demonstrates the importance of investor attention to the pricing of stocks, providing consistent evidence that attention (inattention) to firm-specific information and events is associated with positive (negative) capital market effects (e.g., Hirshleifer and Teoh 2003; Hirshleifer, Lim, and Teoh 2009) . Another stream of research finds that stock returns comove in ways that fundamentals cannot fully explain, prompting the investigation of behavioral explanations of excess return comovement (e.g., Kumar and Lee 2006; Barberis, Shleifer, and Wurgler 2005) . This paper sits at the intersection of these two literatures. Our research objectives are twofold. First, we investigate the extent to which investor attention comoves (i.e., how much of a firm's attention is explained by industry-and market attention).
We quantify attention comovement and investigate factors explaining the level of attention comovement for a given firm. Second, we examine whether attention comovement helps explain the excess comovement of stock returns documented in prior work.
The investor attention literature is based on the idea that attention is a limited resource.
That is, because investors cannot pay attention to all stocks or acquire and process all relevant information, they must be selective about the particular stocks they choose to follow (Hirshleifer and Teoh 2003) . This literature has largely focused on firm-specific attention.
1 In this paper, we extend the attention literature by estimating the extent to which firm-specific attention comoves with industry/market attention. We conjecture that investor attention will comove as investors collectively focus on similar firms and their correlated information flows. This notion follows from a noise trader model, such as that in Barberis, Shleifer and Wurgler (2005) , in which different investor groups experience categorical or correlated sentiment, which in turn leads to "sentiment-based" returns comovement. We extend the literatures on investor attention and categorical sentiment by introducing the idea that investor attention will comove as investor groups systematically seek out information for similar stocks or as they experience correlated shocks to the demand for information. To our knowledge, no prior study has explicitly examined the concept of attention comovement, nor its capital market implications. 2 An intuitive category for categorical sentiment is a firm's industry. All else equal, we would expect that firms in the same industry would have fundamentals and attention that move together. To develop a measure of attention comovement, we follow a similar methodology to the returns comovement literature to identify the amount of attention a firm receives that is explained by industry and market-wide attention. We use four unique measures of the amount of attention paid to a particular firm: (1) internet searches (i.e., Google search for a firm's ticker),
(2) analyst forecast revisions, (3) business press articles, and (4) requests for a firm's EDGAR financial filings. We also compile a composite score of all four measures using factor analysis and label the resulting factor "A-Score," (short for attention-score). We regress each of our attention proxies on measures of industry and market attention, which are created by aggregating firm-level measures within industries and across the market. We then use the R 2 from these annual, firm-specific regressions as a measure of attention comovement-the greater amount of firm-level attention that is explained by industry and market attention (i.e., higher R 2 ), the lower the amount of firm-specific attention paid to the stock. These measures capture the comovement in firm attention with industry and market attention.
We conduct our analyses using a broad cross-section of 5,663 firm-year observations from the 2007 to 2011 time period. We first provide evidence on the importance of industry/market attention: we find that the average R 2 from these regressions is 17.5%, ranging from 6.3% for Google Internet searches to 26.6% for EDGAR financial filing searches. These numbers reveal that a fair portion of the variation in firm-specific attention is explained by variation in industry/market attention. In other words, some of the attention paid to a firm by investors, analysts, and the business press is associated with attention paid to the firm's industry or the market in general. The implication of this result is that inferences in prior research focusing on firm-specific attention are likely to be partially driven by industry/market attention.
Next, we examine factors that are related to attention comovement. We find that firms with higher earnings comovement are more likely to have their attention comove with industry and market attention, suggesting that comovement in firm fundamentals is positively related to attention comovement. In addition, we find that, after controlling for the influence of fundamentals comovement, attention comovement is higher for large firms and more visible firms. This finding suggests that when investors are paying attention to a particular industry or the market as a whole, they also concentrate on the larger, more visible firms within industries and the market. For example, when investor attention moves to tech stocks, it likely implicitly falls on the prominent players in the tech industry, such as Apple or Microsoft. On the other hand, we find that institutional ownership is negatively related to attention comovement, suggesting that attention comovement is negatively related to investor sophistication. Overall, the implication of these findings is that attention comoves in excess of what is explained by comovement in firm fundamentals and this excess comovement of attention is associated with firm characteristics.
Having identified the factors that are associated with cross-sectional variation in attention comovement, we next investigate its capital market effects. In these analyses, we draw on the returns comovement literature. The notion that the returns of related assets move in tandem is a fundamental concept in asset pricing theory. Theoretically, in a well-functioning, frictionless market, the comovement of asset prices should be tightly linked to comovement in asset fundamentals. Early research documented that firm stock returns covary with both market and industry returns (e.g., King 1966) and that firm-level earnings covary with industry and market earnings (e.g., Ball and Brown 1967) . The comovement in earnings is consistent with a fundamentals-based explanation for the comovement in returns. However, recent research documents that return comovement cannot be fully explained by comovement in fundamentals (e.g., Barberis et al., 2005) .
Subsequent comovement research focused on similarities in firm characteristics as an explanation for return comovement. 3 These studies tend to identify categories within which prices, which are the outcome of information acquisition and trading activities, comove. In other words, prior research focuses on the outcome (excess return comovement) without necessarily examining the information flows leading to that outcome. For example, Grullon et al (2014) propose that firms sharing a lead underwriter comove because the lead underwriters share information about these firms with investors; however, these information flows are not observable. In this study, we quantify the correlated actions of investors and information intermediaries to gather and supply information about firms. Therefore, we can speak to the information mechanisms that can influence excess returns comovement. The concept of categorical comovement has been proposed in prior research (Barberis et al 2005; Morck et al 2000) , but our operationalization and quantification of categorical attention-i.e., that attention covaries for related firms-is novel to the literature. In our paper, we focus on the category of industry. 4 We find that comovement in investor attention is positively related to comovement in equity returns and trading volume. 5 In other words, when the extent to which market participants pay attention to a stock is strongly associated with the level of attention to the stock's industry and to the market in general, the stock's returns and trading volume are more strongly linked to industry and market-level returns and trading volume. These results hold after controlling for comovement in firm fundamentals, as well as after controlling for firm characteristics that prior research finds to be related to returns comovement. The implication of this finding is that the correlated attention of investors and other market participants can affect comovement in asset prices, an idea that is new to the literature.
An implication of these findings is that factors that draw attention to a particular firm may also increase the amount of attention that investors pay to other firms that share a similar categorical attribute, such as industry membership. For example, as earnings news draws attention to a given firm, it may also draw attention to related firms. In our final set of tests, we provide direct evidence on whether investors shift their attention based on significant firm events within the industry. We find that earnings announcements also trigger significant increases in investor attention for "peer" firms (other firms in the same industry). We also find that investor 4 Another way to distinguish our work is to note that comovement studies to date basically focus on finding categories and showing that firms in the category comove with each other more than they comove with firms outside the category. Our work is more like the traditional synchronicity literature (e.g., Morck et al. 2000) , which investigates determinants of the level of comovement within a particular category (in our case, industry). 5 We extend prior work by examining trading volume as well as returns. As trading is necessary for price changes, trading comovement should also be related to the attention paid to a firm; we document the existence of this relation.
attention is stronger for "peer" firms when the announcing firm's attention comoves more with other firms in the industry and market. This evidence is consistent with significant firm events triggering investors to pay more attention to similar or related firms.
Our paper contributes to the literatures on investor attention, comovement in asset prices/volume, and intra-industry information transfer. Using multiple measures of attention, we provide the first evidence on how firm-level attention varies with industry and market-level attention. We document that attention has capital market effects: firms that are generally viewed in the context of their industry and the market have stock returns and trading volume closely linked to industry and market activity. Lastly, we provide some evidence that significant corporate events, such as earnings announcements, trigger investor attention for related firms, which we define as firms that share the same industry.
DATA, VARIABLES, AND SAMPLE

Measures of Attention
Our analysis requires measures of investor attention to compute attention comovement.
To capture investor attention, we employ four state-of-the-art measures that have been used in prior research: internet search volume, analyst forecast revisions, the count of business press mentions for a particular firm, and the number of EDGAR downloads of a firm's financial statements. To calculate internet search volume, we obtain a proprietary database of investors' weekly search activities made available by Google through their Google Trends application.
6
Google Trends tracks and reports the Search Volume Index (SVI), which is a relative measure of 6 We employ weekly rather than daily Google search data because it allows us to investigate a much broader sample of firms. As discussed in Drake et al. (2012) , daily Google search data is only available for larger, well-recognized firms. Da et al. (2011) is another example of prior research using weekly Google search.
user searches for a particular term on the Google search engine. The third measure of attention is business press coverage, Media i,w , which is equal to the number of articles issued by the business press for each firm-week. 10 We obtain business press data from RavenPack, which provides data on business press coverage through the Dow Jones News Archives and Wall Street Journal (Drake, Guest and Twedt 2014) . While the data obtained from RavenPack is not comprehensive of all press outlets, the large circulation of these two outlets makes them well suited to investigate market effects of the business press (Tetlock 2007).
Our fourth proxy for investor attention, Edgar i,w , is the number of EDGAR downloads for a given firm's 10-Ks or 10-Qs during a given week. EDGAR is the SEC's online repository for all SEC-mandated filings, among which are the 10-K (annual report) and 10-Q (quarterly report). report that the 10-K and 10-Q reports are among the most highly downloaded SEC filings while Lee et al. (2015) report that EDGAR requests tend to cluster around related firms. Therefore, we use the Edgar i,w variable as a proxy for investor attention to financial statements.
Measures of Comovement
Our first objective is to examine the extent to which attention is an industry and marketwide phenomenon. To achieve this objective, we employ a methodology similar to that used in the returns comovement literature, which regresses firm returns on industry and market returns and employs the explained variation (R 2 ) as a measure of returns comovement (e.g., Morck et al. 2000 To obtain an estimate of attention comovement (or synchronicity, as it is sometimes called in prior research), we take the log transformation of the R 2 , similar to the approach in Morck et al (2000) :
where R 2 is the coefficient of determination from the firm-year estimation of equation (1). 12 We compute a "SYNC" variable for each of the four attention variables -Sync Google, Sync Analyst, Sync Media, and Sync Edgar -using this approach. By constructing the comovement measure in this way, we can interpret increases in attention synchronicity variables as indicating that a given firm's attention is more closely tied to industry and market attention. In other words, higher values of attention synchronicity serve as a proxy for higher attention comovement, i.e., the extent to which a firm's attention comoves with industry and market attention.
13
Once we calculate each of the attention synchronicity variables, we create a composite attention synchronicity variable (Sync A-Score i,t ). We conduct a factor analysis with our four attention synchronicity variables and retain the principal factor. 14 In our subsequent analyses, we focus primarily on the results using the Sync A-Score i,t variable because we believe that it best captures the underlying construct of attention comovement.
We compute returns and volume comovement measures using a similar methodology.
We follow Piotroski and Roulstone (2004) and compute Sync Ret i,t using the R 2 from the following regression calculated for each fiscal year end using the previous 52 weeks of data:
12 The log transformation allows a bounded variable-the R 2 is bounded between 0 and 1-to take a continuous form, and has been used in other studies that employ the R 2 as a variable of interest (e.g., Piotroski and Roulstone 2004) . 13 We refer to these variables as "synchronicity" variables because they are calculated in a similar manner to the return synchronicity variables in Morck et al. (2000) and Piotroski and Roulstone (2004) . We use the general term "comovement" to refer to correlations in returns, trading volume, fundamentals, and our attention proxies across firms in the same industry. 14 The results of principal factor analysis (untabulated) reveal that all four attention variables -Sync Google i,t , Sync Analyst i,t , Sync Media i,t , and Sync Edgar i,t -converge to a single significant underlying factor with an Eigenvalue greater than 1.0.
Ret i,w = ω + ω 1 Ind Ret i,w + ω 2 Market Ret i,w + ε (3)
Ret i,w is the weekly return for firm i in week w. Ind Ret i,w is the equal-weighed industry return (two-digit SIC code) in week w (excluding firm i). Market Ret i,w is the equal-weighted market return for week w (excluding firm i). Similar to the attention synchronicity variables, we estimate equation (3) for each firm and fiscal period, requiring at least 45 weekly observations. To obtain an estimate of return synchronicity, we take the log transformation of the R 2 , similar to the approach in Morck et al (2000):
While the synchronicity literature has focused on comovement in stock returns, we also investigate the extent to which trading volume in a firm covaries with the trading volume of the firm's industry and with the market in general. We calculate stock turnover synchronicity, Sync 
Data and Sample
We obtain data from seven different databases including Compustat (financial data), CRSP (market data), IBES (analyst data), Thomson Reuters (institutional ownership data), RavenPack (business press data), Google Trends (Google search data), and EDGAR (SEC filing data). The intersection of these datasets results in 5,663 firm-year observations for the 2007 to 2011 time period. 16 For selected analyses conducted at the firm-week level, these databases yield a sample of 218,331 firm-week observations. provides descriptive statistics for our firm-week sample will be discussed later in the paper).
RESULTS
Attention Comovement
Across the four measures, EDGAR downloads appear to exhibit the highest average comovement (mean raw R 2 = 26.6% and mean Sync Edgar i,t = 0.341) 17 , followed by the comovement of analyst forecast revisions (mean raw R 2 = 22.1% and Sync Analyst i,t = 0.271),
business press mentions (mean raw R 2 = 14.6% and Sync Media i,t = 0.172), and internet searches (mean raw R 2 = 6.3% and Sync Google i,t = 0.068). We note that the average raw R 2 across the four measures is 17.5%. We also make note of important sample firm characteristics. The median firm in our sample is relatively large with a market capitalization of 1.3 billion; one fourth of our sample firms are members of the S&P 500. The majority of firms are profitable (the 25 th percentile for ROA is above zero). The median firm has a book-to-market ratio of 0.546 (Bk/Mkt i,t ), sales growth of 5.6 percent (Sales Growth i,t ), has an institutional ownership percentage of approximately 79 percent (Inst i,t ), and is followed by 7 sell-side analysts (# Analysts i,t ). Table 2 , Panel A presents pairwise correlations and shows that the attention 16 Our sample is constrained to the 2007 to 2011 time period due to the availability of SEC EDGAR and Google search data. 17 Consistent with Lee, et al. (2015) which documents that EDGAR users tend to request filings from groups of peer firms.
comovement measures are highly correlated with each other, with correlation coefficients ranging from 33% to 62%. With the exception of the Google synchronicity measure, each of the individual attention comovement measures is strongly positively associated with the composite attention comovement score (Sync A-Score i,t ), indicating a common attention factor among the variables.
18
We now turn to examining the determinants of attention comovement. The objective of these analyses is to better understand why investors give individual attention to some firms while viewing other firms primarily as members of an industry or market. We do this by regressing attention comovement on comovement in firm fundamentals (proxied by earnings) and other firm characteristics. By so doing, we are able to identify which firm characteristics are associated with a firm's attention being strongly (or weakly) associated with industry and market-wide attention. The regression is specified as follows: 
where
ATTN SYNC is one of five variables -Sync A-Score i,t , Sync Google i,t , Sync Analyst i,t , Sync
Media i,t , and Sync Edgar i,t -as defined above and all independent variables are defined in Appendix A. The unit of observation here is the firm-year, capturing the general association between firm characteristics and attention comovement. We include year fixed effects to account for macroeconomic differences and assess statistical significance using standard errors clustered by firm. 18 The negative correlation between Sync A-Score and Sync Google highlights the unique nature of Google search among the attention variables. While EDGAR search, analyst reports, and media articles are the products of sophisticated market participants, Google search is potentially less likely to represent sophisticated information acquisition. As a robustness check, we have created a new Sync A-Score variable that excludes Google search as an attention measure. Results with this composite attention measure are quantitatively similar to those presented in the paper.
We emphasize that attention comovement is a new construct and thus, our analysis in this section is exploratory in nature. That being said, we do offer the following predictions with respect to selected firm characteristics. First, we expect firms whose fundamentals track closely with the industry and market to have attention that tracks closely with the industry and the market. Thus, we predict a positive association between Sync Earn i,t (which measures the comovement of a firm's return-on-assets with the firm's industry-level return-on-assets) and our measures of attention comovement. Similarly, firms whose fundamentals are more volatile or idiosyncratic will receive attention that is more volatile and idiosyncratic, suggesting lower attention comovement with the industry and market. Thus, we expect a negative coefficient on
Second, investors prefer to invest in securities with which they are familiar (Merton, 1987; Lehavy and Sloan 2008) . This intuition, together with the fact that attention is a limited resource (Hirshleifer and Teoh, 2003) , suggests that investors are more likely to pay attention to larger, "household name" stocks. Consistent with this intuition, prior research finds that larger, more visible stocks are positively associated with Google searches (Drake, Roulstone, and Thornock 2012), analyst following (Bhushan, 1989) , business press coverage (Bushee et al. 2010) , and EDGAR requests (Drake, Roulstone, and Thornock 2014) . Thus, we predict that large, visible stocks will also receive even greater levels of investor attention when the industry/market receives attention. For example, investors who allocate attention to "tech" stocks in general, will also likely allocate attention to "Apple," because Apple is such a visible, important player in the industry and in the market as a whole. Note that in motivating a relation between attention comovement and firm size, we are assuming that industry attention is driven by more than just a few, large firms. If increases in industry attention are driven by increases in attention paid to the largest firms in the industry, In summary, we include multiple variables to capture firm size and visibility, investor sophistication, and possible categories of comovement outside of industry membership. Given our focus on investor attention, we expect firm size and visibility to be the primary drivers of attention comovement in excess of that explained by comovement in fundamentals. attention comovement is not related to membership in the S&P 500 (SP 500 i,t ); this could be due to two, competing forces: firms in the S&P 500 are larger, and more visible which would lead to more comovement; however, prior research has found that firms in the S&P 500 tend to move together, regardless of their industry, which should lead to less comovement with their industry.
Finally, we find that attention comovement is negatively (albeit marginally) related to institutional holdings (Inst i,t ), suggesting that less sophisticated investors (e.g., individual investors) are more likely to pay attention to an individual firm when there is higher attention being paid to the firm's industry and to the market as a whole. The results for the attention measures based on Google, analyst revisions, media reports, and EDGAR downloads, are reported in the second through fifth columns, and are generally consistent with the coefficients reported in the first column. In summary, we show that a firm's attention comoves more with industry and market attention when the firm is more visible, has less sophisticated ownership, and is viewed by investors to be a value stock.
Attention Comovement and Returns/Volume Comovement
We next examine the association between attention comovement and stock market comovement. We examine whether variation in attention comovement incrementally explains variation in market comovement using the following regressions: 
where all variables are as defined above and in Appendix A. The models presented in equation (6) and (7) We note that the sign of the coefficients on the control variables are consistent with expectations and/or the prior literature (e.g., Piotroski and Roulstone, 2004 Overall, the results in Table 4 indicate that the comovement of investor attention is associated with the comovement of the firm's returns and trading volume. Put another way, from the perspective of a given firm, if a firm receives idiosyncratic attention, they also tend to have more idiosyncratic returns and trading volume. From an economic standpoint, the magnitude of the relation between attention comovement and return/trading comovement is plausible and significant, with a one standard deviation increase in Sync A-Score i,t being associated with an increase in Sync Ret i,t (Sync Turn i,t ) of 0.147 (0.217) standard deviations.
Attention comovement around important corporate events
A stream of studies examines the intuition that information announced by one firm can be informative to investors in related firms, a phenomenon often called information transfer (e.g., Foster 1981; Han, Wild and Ramesh 1989; Ramnath 2002; Thomas and Zhang 2008) . These studies show that the earnings announcement for a particular firm can lead to a significant market reaction for related firms. The theory behind intra-industry information transfer is that economic events that drive one firm's news are often related to economic events at peer firms (e.g., firms in the same industry). An untested underlying assumption in this literature is that investor attention comoves, as the earnings news for a given firm draws investor attention to related firms.
We build on the information transfer literature and use the setting of intra-industry earnings news as an alternate way to show the phenomenon of attention comovement.
Specifically, in our final set of tests, we extend prior research by investigating whether earnings announcements also trigger investor attention in related "peer" firms. We also examine whether the relation between investor attention and a peer firm's earnings announcement is explained, in part, by the extent to which the firm's attention comovement (i.e., its attention comoves with industry and market attention).
In the analyses above, we employed firm-year level data; for these analyses, we change the unit of observation to the firm-week, allowing us to more precisely focus on investor attention around a corporate announcement. Further, in order to more precisely identify "peer" firms, we identify related firms as those operating in the same four-digit SIC code as a given firm. 20 Table 1 A. Since the level of attention a firm receives is likely to be highly correlated through time, we also include firm fixed effects in the model. We assess statistical significance using standard errors clustered by week.
An intuitive way to view equation (8) In equation (8), we include EA i,w as attention for a firm should increase during the week that firm releases its own earnings. We also include controls for firm i, including firm size (Mkt Val i,q ), book-to-market, sales growth, return-on-assets, institutional ownership, analyst uncertainty (Uncertainty i,q ), the competitiveness of the firm's industry (Comp i,q ), and recent stock return performance (MOM i,q ). Lastly, we delete all firm-week observations in which the firm and another peer firm in the industry both announce earnings. When these two events happen simultaneously, it becomes more difficult to understand whether the increase in attention is related to the firm's earnings announcement or the peer firm's earnings announcement.
22 Table 5 presents the results of estimating equation (8). Again, the leftmost column, we present the results using A-Score i,w as the dependent variable. In each of the subsequent columns, the dependent variable is one of the individual attention variables. Across all five regressions we find that the coefficient on EA i,w is positive and significant, confirming that investor attention significantly increases during the week of a firm's earnings announcement.
Further, the coefficient on Peer EA i,w is positive and statistically significant for all measures of attention. This suggests that investors' attention for a given firm increases when a peer firm releases earnings to the public. That is, these results provide additional evidence for the comovement of attention across firms within an industry and provide a source for some of that comovement: firm information releases spark attention both for the disclosing firm and for peer firms in the same industry.
The coefficient on EA i,w , captures the increase in investor attention for a particular firm when that firm announces earnings and provides a benchmark against which we can assess the economic significance of the increase in investor attention observed when a peer firm announces earnings. We take the ratio of the coefficient on Peer EA i,w to the coefficient on EA i,w in the same model specification. Higher values of this ratio are consistent with greater levels of investor attention comovement. This ratio is equal to 6.9% when AScore i,w is the dependent variable and ranges between 2.0 percent for analyst forecasts and 43.2 percent for Google searches. We interpret these results as suggesting an economically meaningful relation between peer firm announcements and attention given to a firm.
In our final set of tests, we estimate equation (8) In Table 6 we present results with A-Score i,w as the dependent variable. For firms with low and high levels of attention comovement, we find a positive and significant coefficient on
Peer EA j,w , consistent with the results presented in Table 5 . However, we find that the coefficient on Peer EA j,w for the low attention comovement subsample is 0.064 and that the coefficient on Peer EA j,w for the high attention comovement subsample is 0.170. 23 This represents a 170% higher level of information transfer for the high attention comovement subsample. A Chow F-test confirms that these coefficients are statistically different from each other at the 1% level. This finding suggests that firms with investor attention that is generally more strongly associated with the amount of attention paid to their industry, experience greater increases in investor attention when a peer firm in that industry discloses news to the public. In other words, firms that receive more (less) firm-specific attention are less (more) likely to receive attention when firms in their industry release news. We also find that the coefficient on EA i,w is lower for firms with high attention comovement; this difference is statistically significant but economically small. This finding is consistent with earnings announcements containing less firm-specific information for firms whose attention is strongly tied to industry levels of attention.
Our results support the idea that significant firm events can trigger investors to pay attention to other firms that are in the same industry and that this relation is stronger for firms with greater industry and market attention comovement.
CONCLUSION
This paper investigates the extent to which the amount of attention a firm receives from investors and other market participants comoves with the amount of attention paid to their industry and the market as whole. We also examine the capital market impact of this attention comovement. We find that approximately one-fifth of the variation in firm-specific attention is explained by industry-and market-attention. Further, we identify specific firm characteristics that are related to the level of this attention co-movement. We find that attention comovement is positively related to earnings comovement (a proxy for the comovement in firm fundamentals) and firm visibility. We also show that the comovement in attention is positively associated with the comovement in stock returns and trading volume, suggesting that comovement in stock returns and trading outcomes is partially driven by the actions of investors who view individual firms in the context of categories such as industry. Finally, we document that an important information event (earnings announcements) can increase attention for related firms, once again suggesting an industry component to attention. We document that this effect is more pronounced for firms that are more likely to receive attention at the same time as other firms in the industry and market.
Our results suggest that information flows (proxied by our attention measures) help explain comovement in capital market outcomes (i.e., returns and trading volume). This finding is consistent with the arguments in Barberis et al. (2005) that comovement in returns is driven by investors categorizing firms according to similar characteristics, trading subsets of stocks rather than individual stocks, and information diffusion across stocks occurring at different rates for stocks in different categories. We show that when information flows for a stock are focused on the stock and are not explained by industry and market information flows, returns and trading volume for the stock are more idiosyncratic. While we cannot establish a causal relation between attention comovement and return/ volume comovement, we believe it unlikely that return/trading volume comovement drives attention comovement. Thus, our results are suggestive of a relation that goes from attention comovement to returns/volume comovement.
Future research can continue to explore the characteristics and events associated with these forms of comovement as well as the implications of their relation.
Appendix A Variable Definition # Analysts i,t
equal to the number of analysts following firm i in year t. Abs (Ret i,t ) equal to the buy and hold abnormal monthly return for firm i in fiscal year t. Analyst For i,w equal to the number of analyst forecasts issued in week w for firm i. A-Score i,w a factor analysis using the Google i,w , Analyst For i,w , Media i,w , and Edgar i,w variables to identify the common factor and calculate the A-Score i,t variable for firm i during week w. Bk/Mkt i,q equal to the book value of equity divided by the market value of equity for firm i in quarter q. Bk/Mkt i,t equal to the book value of equity divided by the market value of equity for firm i in year t. Comp i,q equal to one minus the Herfindahl Hirschman Index, which is calculated at the annual level. We first divide the firm's annual sales by the total industry (4-digit SIC code) sales then square the ratio. We then sum the squared ratio by industry. EA i,w equal to one during the week firm i announces earnings and zero otherwise. Mkt Val i,q equal to the market value for firm i calculated at the end of the fiscal quarter q. MOM i,q equal to the buy and hold daily return during quarter q-1 for firm i. MVE i,t equal to the market value of equity for firm i at the end of fiscal year t. Peer EA i,w equal to one for firm i in week w if a peer firm (i.e., firm in the same four-digit SIC code) announces earnings in week w and zero otherwise. Price i,t is equal to the stock price for firm i at the end of fiscal year t. ROA i,q equal to net income before extraordinary items in quarter q scaled by total assets in quarter q-4 for firm i. ROA i,t equal to net income for firm i in year t scaled by total assets in year t-1. Sales Growth i,q equal to the sales in quarter q divided by sales in quarter q-4 for firm i. Sales Growth i,t equal to sales in year t divided by sales in year t-1 for firm i. Std ROA i,t equal to the standard deviation of return on assets between year t-4 and t for firm i. equal to the logarithmic transformation, defined as log(R 2 / (1 -R 2 )), of the R 2 from a regression of the firm's return on assets on a value-weighted industry index of ROA using quarters t-11 through t. Sync Edgar i,t calculated similarly to the Sync Google i,t variable using the number of searches for 10-Ks or 10-Qs during week w for firm i. Sync Google i,t equal to the logarithmic transformation of the R 2 , defined as log(R 2 / (1 -R 2 )), using the following model using data over the 52 week period prior to the fiscal year end for firm i in year t: Google i,w = α + α Ind Google i,w + Mkt Google i,w + ε, where Google i,w is equal to the Google search volume for firm i in week w, Ind Google i,w is equal to the value weighted Google search volume for industry j (defined as two digit SIC code) in week w, and the Mkt Google i,w is equal to the value-weighted google search volume for all firms with Google search volume in week w. Sync Media i,t calculated similarly to the Sync Google i,t variable using the number of media articles written during week w for firm i. Sync Ret i,t calculated similarly to the attention synchronicity variables using returns for firm i during week w. Sync Turn i,t calculated similarly to the attention synchronicity variables using stock turnover for firm i during week w. Uncertainty i,q equal to the average squared analyst forecast error for firm i during quarter q, as presented in Barron, Kim, Lim and Stevens (1998) and Barron, Byard and Kim (2002) . Specifically, we compute the variable with the following equation: (1 -(1/N)) * D + SE, where N is the number of analysts following the firm, D is the dispersion of analyst forecasts, and SE is the squared error in the mean forecast. Standard errors are clustered by firm. Year indicator variables are included in the regression but the coefficient estimates are suppressed for brevity. *, **, *** indicate two-tailed statistical significance at 10%, 5%, and 1%. Standard errors are clustered by week. Firm fixed effects are included in the regression but the coefficient estimates are suppressed for brevity. *, **, *** indicate two-tailed statistical significance at 10%, 5%, and 1%. 0.7180 All variables are defined in Appendix A. T-statistics are presented below the coefficient estimates. Standard errors are clustered by week. Firm fixed effects are included in the regression but the coefficient estimates are suppressed for brevity. *, **, *** indicate two-tailed statistical significance at 10%, 5%, and 1%.
